Rough Draft:
There was a lot of denial on the U.S. side which dismissed these actions and announced them as untrue. Because the U.S. already had the majority of its peoples’ support, the denial of these actions were once again supported by the U.S. people, without further inspection or questioning. This once again one-sided view shows that the U.S. peoples were extremely bias, somewhat subconsciously. They believed what their nation told them and chose not to let another view rattle their own.
Final:
President Johnson and government officials dismissed these accusations through speeches that displayed the U.S. as a hero for countries being overtaken by the communist regime. In the July 28th speech, Johnson outlined this heroism through these last empowering lines:
We did not choose to be the guardians at the gate, but there is no one else. Nor would surrender in Viet-Nam bring peace, because we learned from Hitler in Munich that success only feeds the appetite of aggression. This then, my fellow Americans, is why we are in Viet-Nam (Document 5).
Because Johnson already had the majority of his peoples’ trust, very few questioned his statement. They believed what their leaders told them and chose not to let another view rattle their own.
There was a lot of denial on the U.S. side which dismissed these actions and announced them as untrue. Because the U.S. already had the majority of its peoples’ support, the denial of these actions were once again supported by the U.S. people, without further inspection or questioning. This once again one-sided view shows that the U.S. peoples were extremely bias, somewhat subconsciously. They believed what their nation told them and chose not to let another view rattle their own.
Final:
President Johnson and government officials dismissed these accusations through speeches that displayed the U.S. as a hero for countries being overtaken by the communist regime. In the July 28th speech, Johnson outlined this heroism through these last empowering lines:
We did not choose to be the guardians at the gate, but there is no one else. Nor would surrender in Viet-Nam bring peace, because we learned from Hitler in Munich that success only feeds the appetite of aggression. This then, my fellow Americans, is why we are in Viet-Nam (Document 5).
Because Johnson already had the majority of his peoples’ trust, very few questioned his statement. They believed what their leaders told them and chose not to let another view rattle their own.
Gulf of Tonkin Incident
On August 2nd and 4th, 1964, the USS Maddox and Turner Joy were attacked by three North Vietnamese Navy torpedo boats. North Vietnam, however, said the attacks were provoked by U.S. violent engagement on the shores of Da Nang. However, President Johnson and other U.S. authorities denied these claims and so did most citizens of the U.S.. With the support of his congress and the nation, Johnson was given authority to open warfare against North Vietnam. His argument was that it would save Southeast Asia from the spread of communism. Despite President Johnson’s announcements that the U.S. was the innocent victim of the attacks, the strikes on the Maddox and Turner Joy were in fact provoked by U.S. actions.
On July 28th, 1965, president Johnson gave a speech laying out his rationale for U.S. intervention to save South Vietnam from Asian communism. Of the civilians that listened to this speech, many believed that the Gulf of Tonkin attacks on the U.S. ships were not justifiable, and therefore supported the government’s plan of striking back. In an interview on NBC-TV, Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, said, “And the essential fact was that our vessels were being attacked on the high seas by these boats and we had to do something” (Document 2). This kind of evidence is what drove citizens to feel that they were the victims and fighting back was only fair. They believed that the “counter attacks” were merely self-defense and were much deserved by the North Vietnamese. However, reading between the lines of these statements, one can see many critical pieces of information missing. Rusk carried on this pattern through this vague statement: There is a great gulf of understanding between that world and our world, ideological in character (Document 2). As Secretary of State, responsible for diplomacy with other nations, Rusk was saying peaceful negotiations were impossible due to the vast ideological gap.
From the speeches and interviews with U.S. officials, there was much being omitted because of their bias. U.S. officials and citizens have biases against other nations who have differing ideologies and philosophies of governing. Because Johnson wanted to take advantage of this bias, he did not share information about North Vietnam’s view on the attacks. He did this to portray his nation as the victim and to imply superiority. The arguments were very one-sided, which made it hard to understand what was truly happening. However, most citizens trusted their leaders, which led to this false portrayal of the Gulf of Tonkin incident.
After the August 2nd and 4th attacks, North Vietnamese officials made a plea, trying to justify their reasons for attacking the U.S. ships. The spokesman of the Viet Nam People’s Army, said “Warships of the U.S. 7th Fleet stationed on a permanent basis off Da Nang naval port have on many occasions covered ships and boats of their henchmen in South Viet Nam which come to the North daily to carry out provocative activities, infringe upon the territorial waters of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, seize fishing boats and land spy-commandos for sabotage activities in the costal areas” (Document 9). President Johnson and government officials dismissed these accusations through speeches that displayed the U.S. as a hero for countries being overtaken by the communist regime. In the July 28th speech, Johnson outlined this heroism through these last empowering lines:
We did not choose to be the guardians at the gate, but there is no one else. Nor would surrender in Viet-Nam bring peace, because we learned from Hitler in Munich that success only feeds the appetite of aggression. This then, my fellow Americans, is why we are in Viet-Nam (Document 5).
Because Johnson already had the majority of his peoples’ trust, very few questioned his statement. They believed what their leaders told them and chose not to let another view rattle their own.
Not only did the North Vietnamese expose some major pieces of evidence showing provocative actions on their towns, but Johnson himself even confessed to these allegations. On August 3rd, 1964, in a conversation between President Johnson and Robert Anderson, Johnson privately recalled some violent actions on the North Vietnamese territory: There have been some covert operations in that area that we have been carrying on⎯blowing up some bridges and things of that kind, roads and so forth (Document 3). The conversation exposed Johnson’s true knowledge when he said he understood why the North Vietnamese fired on the U.S. ships. “So I imagine they wanted to put a stop to it,” Johnson said (Document 3). He understood that they had had enough of these “small”, but degrading attacks, and did what they had to do to stop it. Seeing Johnson reveal this in secrecy, shows that the attack was indeed provoked. The job of a president is to run and protect their nation, meaning that a president would not intentionally say something aloud that could jeopardize their people’s support. So although he never publicly announced it, he was merely trying to ensure congressional and popular approval for his attack on North Vietnam--even though it was not justified.
On July 28th, 1965, president Johnson gave a speech laying out his rationale for U.S. intervention to save South Vietnam from Asian communism. Of the civilians that listened to this speech, many believed that the Gulf of Tonkin attacks on the U.S. ships were not justifiable, and therefore supported the government’s plan of striking back. In an interview on NBC-TV, Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, said, “And the essential fact was that our vessels were being attacked on the high seas by these boats and we had to do something” (Document 2). This kind of evidence is what drove citizens to feel that they were the victims and fighting back was only fair. They believed that the “counter attacks” were merely self-defense and were much deserved by the North Vietnamese. However, reading between the lines of these statements, one can see many critical pieces of information missing. Rusk carried on this pattern through this vague statement: There is a great gulf of understanding between that world and our world, ideological in character (Document 2). As Secretary of State, responsible for diplomacy with other nations, Rusk was saying peaceful negotiations were impossible due to the vast ideological gap.
From the speeches and interviews with U.S. officials, there was much being omitted because of their bias. U.S. officials and citizens have biases against other nations who have differing ideologies and philosophies of governing. Because Johnson wanted to take advantage of this bias, he did not share information about North Vietnam’s view on the attacks. He did this to portray his nation as the victim and to imply superiority. The arguments were very one-sided, which made it hard to understand what was truly happening. However, most citizens trusted their leaders, which led to this false portrayal of the Gulf of Tonkin incident.
After the August 2nd and 4th attacks, North Vietnamese officials made a plea, trying to justify their reasons for attacking the U.S. ships. The spokesman of the Viet Nam People’s Army, said “Warships of the U.S. 7th Fleet stationed on a permanent basis off Da Nang naval port have on many occasions covered ships and boats of their henchmen in South Viet Nam which come to the North daily to carry out provocative activities, infringe upon the territorial waters of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, seize fishing boats and land spy-commandos for sabotage activities in the costal areas” (Document 9). President Johnson and government officials dismissed these accusations through speeches that displayed the U.S. as a hero for countries being overtaken by the communist regime. In the July 28th speech, Johnson outlined this heroism through these last empowering lines:
We did not choose to be the guardians at the gate, but there is no one else. Nor would surrender in Viet-Nam bring peace, because we learned from Hitler in Munich that success only feeds the appetite of aggression. This then, my fellow Americans, is why we are in Viet-Nam (Document 5).
Because Johnson already had the majority of his peoples’ trust, very few questioned his statement. They believed what their leaders told them and chose not to let another view rattle their own.
Not only did the North Vietnamese expose some major pieces of evidence showing provocative actions on their towns, but Johnson himself even confessed to these allegations. On August 3rd, 1964, in a conversation between President Johnson and Robert Anderson, Johnson privately recalled some violent actions on the North Vietnamese territory: There have been some covert operations in that area that we have been carrying on⎯blowing up some bridges and things of that kind, roads and so forth (Document 3). The conversation exposed Johnson’s true knowledge when he said he understood why the North Vietnamese fired on the U.S. ships. “So I imagine they wanted to put a stop to it,” Johnson said (Document 3). He understood that they had had enough of these “small”, but degrading attacks, and did what they had to do to stop it. Seeing Johnson reveal this in secrecy, shows that the attack was indeed provoked. The job of a president is to run and protect their nation, meaning that a president would not intentionally say something aloud that could jeopardize their people’s support. So although he never publicly announced it, he was merely trying to ensure congressional and popular approval for his attack on North Vietnam--even though it was not justified.